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Executive Summary
1) Background
Rice farming is a very important agricultural policy issue for the Korean government not
only because rice is a staple food for the Korean population but because rice production is also
an important source of income for those involved in rice farming. The importance of rice
production to the agricultural sector of Korea is indicated by the fact that 49% of Korea’s
agricultural land is devoted to rice production. Therefore, Korean agricultural policy has focused
on rice production issues as well as the income of farmers involved in rice production.
To support rice farming income, the Korean government has been implementing a direct
payment program for rice paddies which gives subsidies to rice farmers since 2003. However, it
is unclear whether rice farming income has increased since this program started because the
amount of the payment is calculated not by income level but by the price of rice and given to the
land owners whether they actually farm the paddies or not.
2) Analysis
To discover whether rice farming income has increased since the direct payment program
was implemented, a comparison of rice farming income data between 1993-2002 and 2003-2012
was undertaken. Data show that rice farming income has not increased since the direct payment
program was implemented. In fact, rice farming household income has decreased by 10.3% from
2003 to 2012 after increasing by 34.2% from 1993 to 2002. Considering that agricultural income
as a whole increased by 15.5% and average national household income increased by 52.9% from
2003 to 2012, rice farming income has been in decline.
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The reason why rice farming income has not increased can be explained by some
conditions during that period. Direct payments are calculated based on the gap between the target
price and the realized price. The target price of rice has been fixed since 2003 even though other
economic factors such as GDP per capita, average income per household and CPI(Consumer
Price Index) have significantly increased. In addition, rice consumption per capita in Korea went
down from 83.2kg in 2003 to 69.8kg in 2012. Furthermore, rice farming area per household
declined from 22,146m2 in 2003 to 20,030m2 in 2012, and the number of individuals per rice
farming household also declined from 2.96 in 2003 to 2.55 in 2012.
3) Recommendations
Considering that GDP per capita in Korea increased by 60% during the period, it is
necessary to adjust the target price for direct payment calculation to some degree. Because the
subsidy is determined by the gap between the target price and the realized price, adjusting the
target price will increase amount of payment to rice farmers and it can make rice farming income
also increase.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the rice production subsidy has to be given to the
real farmers who actually grow the rice crops. And for the income support to be appropriate, the
calculation of direct payment has to take into account the income level of rice farming
households.
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1. Introduction
Rice is the staple food of Korea and one of the country’s most important agricultural
commodities. Rice farming in Korea started around 2,000 B.C. and since that time Koreans have
used rice as a staple food, often eating it with every meal.1 For thousands of years, most of
Korean agriculture was rice farming. Recently various kinds of agricultural products have
become more prevalent, including horticulture products, green house farming and other special
crops which are more profitable. Nevertheless, rice paddies make up 49% of the total agricultural
area of Korea and rice is the most important source of nutrition. As a result, policy related to rice
production has become one of the most crucial issues in Korea.
To maintain the rice industry, the Korean government has implemented several programs
such as increasing yield, irrigation, seed improvement and import quota. Furthermore, given that
rice farming could not be maintained without farmers, the Korean government has also
established rice production subsidies to help stabilize or increase the income of rice farmers to
keep them in the business of rice farming.
Traditionally, income support for the agricultural sector has been implemented by price
support from the Public Stocking in Korea. With the Public Stocking scheme, government
bought overproduced rice from farmers, then put it on the market in order to lower the rice price
when the price is too high. Sometimes the Korean government used the stocked rice for aid to the
North Korea or other countries which suffered the shortage of food. But since 2003, the main
instrument of the agricultural income support policy especially for the rice paddies has been

1

Ho-Chul Lee, “Study of the Agricultural Economics”, Kyungbook University. Korea. 1989.
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changed from Public Stocking to Direct Payment2. It was assumed that direct payment would be
helpful to maintain farmer’s income, but a critical question is whether rice farmers really have
had sufficient income since this program has been implemented.
For example, the amount of money that would be provided to farmers has been
calculated by the price of rice rather than whether any farmer’s income was high enough or not.
In addition, the funds were provided to the landowner. A farmer who rents land for rice farming
could not get direct payment, but the landowner who does not carry on farming could.
In light of this, it is necessary to examine whether this program really increases income
level for farming households, which was presumably one of the goals of the rice production
subsidy programs3.
Previous studies about government support for agriculture including income policies and
their effectiveness will be discussed first. Then, the status of agriculture in South Korea and the
direct payment program for rice paddies will be discussed. Data on direct payment will be
examined to show whether rice farming income has increased since the program was introduced.
To do this, a comparison of rice farming households’ income before and after the program will be
used. Then, the reasons why rice farming income has changed will be discussed.

2

http://www.mafra.go.kr/list.jsp?board_kind=&board_skin_id=&depth=3&division=H&group_id=4&link

_menu_id=&link_target_yn=N&link_url=&menu_id=1233&menu_introduction=&menu_name=&parent
_code=67&popup_yn=N&reference=4&tab_yn=N&code=left&tab_kind=Y&locationId=4
3

Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, “Manual of Agricultural Programs”. Seoul. 2013.
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2. Previous Studies
Government Support for the Agricultural Sector
There are many criticisms that government support for the agricultural sector, including
the direct payment program, is not effective in achieving governmental goals. These views are
mostly based on economics. For example, Bates4 mentioned that government provision and
subsidization have led to inefficiencies and corruption, especially for the inputs such as credit,
extension service, irrigation, seed and fertilizer. He also mentioned that these supports would put
unbearable burdens on the government’s financial situation and advised that these input supports
should be privatized. Furthermore he insisted that subsidies for the agricultural sector should be
eliminated or rapidly reduced.
In July 2012, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published
findings that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) made more than $46 billion in direct
payments to farmers from 2003 to 2011 and recommended that direct payments should be
eliminated or reduced because they created several problems. First, GAO pointed out that much
of the direct payments were paid to farmers who did not grow the right agricultural products.
Farmers who did not grow the right crop received about $10.6 billion. In addition, 0.15% (2,300)
of farmers who received direct payments reported that their lands were fallow. Further, when the
direct payments to farmers were first authorized, they were expected to be transitional, but
subsequent legislation passed in 2002 and 2008 has continued the program, which is no longer
relevant.5

4

Bates R, “Markets and states in tropical Africa”. University of California Press. Berkeley, CA. 1981.

5

United States Government Accountability Office, “Farm programs – Direct payment should be
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Another problem with the program is targeting; direct payments are concentrated among
the larger farmers based on farm size and income. In 2011, 73% of total direct payments were
given to the top 25% of recipients. Moreover, with the current government deficit and debt level,
the U.S. government may not be able to afford direct payments.6 The GAO report also pointed
out that this program may lack effectiveness. Even though direct payments are less distortive
than other programs such as price support, economic distortions can still occur from these
payments. For example, farmers whose farms are not viable by themselves and should shut down
can survive with these payments. This means that marginal farmers who should move to other
jobs are artificially kept in the agricultural business through the subsidies creating economic
distortions.7
On the other hand, some believe that the agricultural sector should not be approached
with an economics view insisting that market failures in the field of agriculture require
government involvement to solve those problems. Some researchers consider issues of income
redistribution or food security as part of this view.
For example, Chang8 pointed out that the concept of government failure is used by
economists who insist that government support has to be eliminated or reduced, but that can be
applied when markets are working perfectly. However, there have been several market failures in
the agricultural sector. He mentioned that market signals can lead agricultural actors to use inputs

reconsidered”. GAO-12-640. 2010.07: 13-14
6

Ibid: 16-17

7

Ibid: 18-19

8

Ha-Joon Chang, “Rethinking public policy in agriculture: lessons from history, distant and recent”.

Journal of Peasant Studies 36:3. United Kingdom. 2009.12: 477-515
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at a less than socially optimal amount. There can be several public goods other than just
agricultural productions such as beautiful scenery and rural amenities in the agricultural field,
and these public goods would be produced at a less than socially optimal level without
government’ intervention. So, agriculture should be supported by government to make up these
problems.
Sometimes certain government actions may make distortions in the short term but
actually increase long-term productivity. Chang mentioned agricultural tariffs as an example.
Tariffs can lead to short-term inefficiencies, but when the tariff revenues are invested by the
government in the agricultural field, it might promote agricultural growth and overall economic
growth in the long run. Furthermore, he suggested that it may be better to create distortions even
when there has been no market failure. For example, if a country has a well-designed welfare
system such as pension or free medical service, low income people could be supported by that
welfare system. But, without that, government should implement policies to improve income
stability.

Income Support Policies for the Agricultural Sector
Park9 offered examples of agricultural income policies in the US, Japan and the EU.
According to him, net farm income per year in the US has increased consistently, reaching
$77,000 per farming household in 2010. Direct payment from government budget made up
approximately 15.5% of this income. Park found that this increase was caused by the Farm

9

Joon-Kee Park, “A study in long-term policy direction in agricultural investment”. KREI 2011-17.

Seoul Korea. 2011.06
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Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which expanded the policy of direct payment given
in fixed amounts of cash unrelated to the real amount of farming output. Furthermore, CounterCyclical Payment (CCP) was adopted to make up for the sudden collapse of global grain prices.10
Park said that the EU has a more scaled-up farming structure than Korea or Japan, and
regional specialization is the key strength of the EU’s agriculture. For example, horticulture is a
specialty in Spain, Italy and Greece, the dairy industry in Finland and Ireland, and hog farming
in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. The EU operates the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and adopted a single direct payment system called the Single Farm Payment Scheme (SPS)
in 2003. Under the SPS system, farmers get payment regardless of their crops. This means that
direct payment does not affect decisions about which crops farmers will grow. This program does
not create inefficiency and farmers can get enough money. In 2009, the total budget for
agriculture in EU was €56 billion, of which 70% (€39 billion) was used for direct payments.11
Park also mentioned the agricultural status and policies of Japan. As in Korea, the staple
food of Japan is rice, so there has been an emphasis on the rice industry. The budget for the
agriculture department in Japan decreased from 3,423 billion yen in 1995 to 2,271 billion yen in
2011, with direct payments to farming households making up 40.4% of the total agricultural
budget. Since 2010, a compensation system for farming household income has been
implemented. Under this system, the difference between target crop prices and realized prices is
paid to farming households through a payment comprising a fixed payment and a variable
payment.12

10

Ibid: 69-70, 79

11

Ibid: 114-115, 119-120, 126-132

12

Ibid: 51-53, 62

9
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Effectiveness of Income Support Policies
There are many criticisms that farming income has not been increased although a large
amount of government support has been provided to farmers and rural areas. Yu13 found that the
effects of agricultural financial expenditure on rural residents’ income are relatively unstable in
the short term, but have a steady and weak positive effect in the long term. When rural residents’
income reaches a certain level due to the government support, a self-promotion mechanism can
be set in order to promote the continued increase in rural residents’ income.
Park14 mentioned that agriculture in South Korea has proceeded in the direction of
specialization and scaling, but the size of agriculture is still relatively small. And, the decrease of
farming income and the increase of income disparity have intensified recently. As a result, the
population in rural areas is being diminished and the settlement condition such as residential and
cultural environment is going steadily downhill, so population and culture of rural areas are
disappearing.
The Korean Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MIFAFF)15 reported
in 2012 that current income stabilization policies such as the direct payment program for rice
paddy have some problems. For example, the direct payment program leans too much toward
rice farming, and the payments cannot overcome the negative effects from globalization efforts
such as the South Korea – United States Free Trade Agreement which went into effect in March

13

Zhi-wei Yu, “Co-intergration analysis of urban resident income, agricultural financial expenditure

and farmers’ income”. Asian Agricultural Research 11-12. Guangzhou China. 2009.01: 8-12
14

Joon-Kee Park, “A study in long-term policy direction in agricultural investment”. KREI 2011-17.

Seoul Korea. 2011.06: 12-20
15

Mifaff, “The improvement plan of farming income stabilization system”. Seoul Korea. 2012.
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2012. MIFAFF suggested policy goals to remedy the situation. First, the Korean government has
to develop various positive values of agriculture and rural areas such as beautiful views and
amenities of rural areas. Second, the current direct payment program should focus on small scale
and elder farmers to a greater degree and set up a control system that can prevent overlapping
support. Third, every policy must be feasible in terms of the ability of the government to pay and
acceptability to farmers or rural residents. Finally, the program should suit international norms
such as considering the limitations from World Trade Organization (WTO) and Aggregate
Measurement of Support (AMS).16
In 2008, Lee and Yang17 analyzed the effects of direct payment under specific scenarios.
They found that when the market price of rice decreased by 30%, income from rice production
decreased by 82%. However due to the income stabilizing effect of direct payment, the real
income of rice farming households was only reduced 11%, while the burden of the government
increased by 202%. If the government reduced the target price by 5%, the amount of variable
payments would be reduced by 54% and the income of farming households would be decreased
by 6%. With this analysis, the positive effect of direct payment was explained.

16

Ibid: 2-3

17

Choon-soo Lee and Seung-ryong Yang, “The effects of rice income direct payment program by

scenario”. Research of Agricultural Economy 49-3. 2008.9
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3. Basic Information
South Korea and its agricultural status
South Korea has an area of 24,641,349 acres and a population of 48,955,203 as of July
2013. In 2012, Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 1,163.5 billion US dollars,18 the 15th
largest among all countries. GDP per capita in 2012 was $23,679.19
<Figure 1: Location of South Korea>

<Table 1: South Korea and Ratio of Agriculture>
Population

Area (acre)

GDP ($)

GDP per capita ($)

Total

48,955,203

24,641,349

1,163.5billion

23,679

Agriculture

2,911,540

4,274,897

39,285million

13,493

Percentage

6%

17%

3%

57%

*Source: The Korean government (Statistics Korea)
As shown in Table 1, the GDP of the agricultural sector of Korea in 2012 was $39 billion
($13,493 per capita). The agricultural population in 2012 was 2,911,540, and the number of

18

$1=1,100 Korean Won

19

Statistics Korea (www.kosis.com).
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farming households was 1,151,116. Agricultural land was 4,274,897 acres, of which rice paddy
comprised 2,098,350 acres (49%), beans including soy beans 230,480 acres (5%), root and tuber
crops such as potato 115,166 acres (3%), chili pepper 112,332 acres (3%).
<Table 2: Budget of the Korean Government in 2013>

*Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance in Korea
As shown in Table 2, the total budget of the Korean government was $311 billion in
2013. The budget allocated for agriculture and fisheries was $16.7 billion or 5.4% of the total
budget, with the budget for the agricultural sector only at $12.3 billion.
<Table 3: Budget for the Agricultural Sector20>

2012

2013

12,434

12,297

2,501

2,788

Farming income and management stability

1,792

1,901

Rural development and welfare

1,446

1,499

Management and distribution of product

2,939

3,181

S.O.C. in agricultural sector22

2,702

1,899

Food industry

609

667

Extra working expenses

132

41

Administrative costs

314

320

Total
Strengthen agriculture constitution

21

*Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea

20

Unit: million U.S. dollars

21

R&D, facility modernization, energy issues, marketing, education and so on.

22

Irrigation, reserve, bank and so on.
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As shown in Table 3, the biggest part of the agricultural sector budget - $3.2 billion - is
spent for the management and distribution of agricultural products, with strengthening
agriculture at $2.8 billion, and farming income and management stability at $1.9 billion.
<Table 4: Budget by Commodity23>
2012

2013

12,434

12,297

Rice

5,010

4,409

Horticulture

1,742

2,171

Livestock

1,106

1,264

609

667

3,966

3,786

Total

Food
Not specified

*Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea
As shown in Table 4, budget in the agricultural sector can be divided by commodity:
$4.4 billion was spent for the rice industry, $2.2 billion for horticulture and $1.3 billion for
livestock.

Direct Payment for the rice paddy
Since the Uruguay Round (UR) and World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement came
into effect, Korea’s markets have been opening up gradually, such as through the South Korea United States Free Trade Agreement that went into effect in March 2012. As Korea’s markets are
becoming more open, its agricultural sector has been damaged. For example, the food and grain

23

Unit: million U.S. dollars
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self-support rate24 have decreased every year as shown in Figure 2.

<Figure 2: Food and grain self-support rate>

Opening the market pushed the government to implement policies which were purposed
to support the agricultural sector, including income support. Before the start of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) system, most countries controlled the price of agricultural products to
protect their own agricultural industry. The Korean government had implemented a Public
Stocking Scheme, which is a purchase and release mechanism based on market price.25
However, after the WTO agreements became effective, the Korean government has been
unable to implement policies that could affect the price directly.26 As a result, a new type of
policy - direct payment to farmers - has been used in many countries such as the US, the EU and
Korea. The staple food of Koreans is rice, so the Korean government has been implementing the
24

Percentage of food and grain consumption which is produced in domestic market.

25

OECD. “Evaluation of Agricultural Policy Reforms in Korea”. 2008.

26

Taeho Lee. “The direction of direct payment policy in the medium and long term”. KREI Forum.

2013.02.
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direct payment program for rice paddies since 2003. This direct payment is composed of two
parts. The first is the fixed payment which is a fixed amount of money paid to rice farmers, and
the second is the variable payment calculated by comparison between the target crop price and
the realized price, which is the sum of market price and amount of fixed payment per household.
The fixed amount is given to the owner of the rice paddy, with the total amount
determined by the size of the paddy. The variable payment is determined by the price of rice.
Every year, there is a target price of rice. If the realized price is lower than the target price, a
variable payment would be made. In the beginning of the year, the fixed payment is given to land
owners, and the variable payment is given after the market price of rice is decided.27

<Table 5: Direct payments for the rice paddy>
Year
Budget
(million
U.S. dollars)

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

433

438

1,368

1,049

901

647

1,115

1,248

561

555

Fixed

433

438

549

652

647

647

575

566

561

555

0

0

126

151

variable
819
397
254
0
540
682
Average rice price
145
148
147
127
134
137
148
129
Per 80kg (U.S. dollars)
**Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea

27

MAFRA, “Implementing Guide for the agricultural programs”. Seoul Korea. 2012.
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Table 5 shows the amount of direct payment given to rice farmers every year. In 2008,
2011 and 2012, the variable payment was not given because the realized price was higher than
the target price.
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4. Income of Rice Farming Household: Rise or Not?
To examine the change of income since the direct payment program was adopted in 2003,
a comparison is made of the rice farming income data 10 years before (1993-2002) and 10 years
after (2003-2012). Using Microsoft Excel, two trend lines were drawn to help compare the two
periods. Each year’s average income of rice farming household data from 1993 to 2012 has been
used28.
<Figure 4: Trends lines before and after program29>

2003 - 2012

1993 - 2002
30000

25000

25000

20000

20000

15000

15000
10000

10000

5000

5000

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

0
1993

0

Figure 4 shows the two trend lines from 1993 to 2002 and from 2003 to 2012. From
2003 to 2012 the trend line has declined (income declined by 10.3% from 21,868 thousand won
to 19,609 thousand won), while the trend line before that period increased (income increased by
34.2% from 15,074 thousand Korean won to 20,225 thousand won). This comparison shows that

28

Data sources: Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS, http://kosis.kr) and Ministry of

Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea
29

Unit: Thousand Korean Won
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the direct payment program did not have a positive effect on the income of rice farming
households.
To determine the effectiveness of the direct payment program more accurately, two more
comparisons were implemented. Average rice farming income was compared with the income of
all farming households, and with the average national income was compared with rice farming
income.30
<Figure 6: Income from Rice Farming Compared To Income from All Agricultural Activities31>
35000

30000

25000

20000

15000
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

rice farming

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

whole agriculture

Figure 6 shows the trend lines of rice farming income and whole agricultural income.
From 2003 to 2012, the average income for agricultural households as a whole increased from
26,878 thousand Korean won to 31,031 thousand won, for a rate of increase of 15.5%. The trend
line shows this increase. The figure also shows that rice farming income declined from 2003 to
2012.

30

Data of total agricultural income and whole national income source: KOSIS

31

Unit: Thousand Korean Won
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<Table 6: Ratio between rice farming income and all agricultural income32>
year

1993

rice
farming
whole
agriculture
ratio

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2012

15,074 17,702 21,046 18,635 20,857 21,868 22,648 24,143 21,824 19,707 19,609
16,928 21,803 23,488 22,323 23,907 26,878 30,503 31,967 30,814 30,148 31,031
89.0%

81.2%

89.6%

83.5%

87.2%

81.4%

74.2%

75.5%

70.8%

65.4%

63.2%

Table 6 shows the ratio between rice farming income and all agricultural income. In
1993, the ratio was 89.0% and decreased slightly to 81.4% in 2003. After 2003, the ratio declined
more sharply, reaching 63.2% in 2012. This means that rice farming income has declined while
income from other agricultural commodities has increased.
<Figure 7: Income from Rice Farming Compared with National Household Income33>
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

ricefarmingincome

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

nationalincome

Figure 7 shows that the national average household income has increased greatly, from

32

Unit: Thousand Korean Won

33

Unit: Thousand Korean Won
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35,280 thousand Korean won in 2003 to 53,950 thousand won in 2012 (52.9%), while income of
rice farming households has declined from 21,868 thousand won in 2003 to 19,609 thousand
won in 2012 (-10.3%).
<Table 7: Ratio between rice farming income and national household income34>
year

1993

rice
farming
national
average
Ratio

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2012

15,074 17,702 21,046 18,635 20,857 21,868 22,648 24,143 21,824 19,707 19,609
17,734 22,933 27,448 26,697 31,501 35,280 39,010 44,105 46,452 50,811 53,950
85.0%

77.2%

76.7%

69.8%

66.2%

62.0%

58.1%

54.7%

47.0%

38.8%

36.3%

Table 7 shows how much rice farming income has declined compared with the national
average income. In 1993, the ratio between rice farming income and national average income
was 85.0%, but it decreased to 62.0% in 2003 and then to 36.3% in 2012.
From the analysis above, a conclusion can be drawn: compared to the period before the
policy was implemented, the income level of rice farming households has not increased since the
direct payment program started. In fact, rice farming income has decreased relative to total
agricultural income and whole national income.

34

Unit: Thousand Korean Won
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5. Discussion
It seems that the direct payment program which was intended to support rice farming
income has not had a sufficient effect. There seems to be two main reasons why the income of
rice farming households has not increased though the direct payment program was implemented:
the direct payment program has internal problems, and the circumstances of the rice industry
were not able to support income at a sufficient level.
The direct payment program has several internal limitations to support sufficient income.
One is that the amount of payment is calculated not by income level but by the rice paddy area.
This means that small-scale farmers who have a small size of rice paddy could not get sufficient
money, while a small number of large-scale farmers get a large amount of money.
In addition, the calculus utilizes the price of rice rather than income. Compensation for
the lack between the target price and the realized price can have a positive effect on income level,
but the target price has never been changed from 170,083 Korean Won per 80kg35 since the
program was first implemented. During that period, national average household income
increased by 52.9%, and GDP per capita increased by 60% from 16,040 thousand won in 2003 to
25,590 thousand won in 2012.36 The fixed target price could be one of the main reasons that rice
farming income did not increase in spite of the direct payment.
It seems that there are also several environmental factors that had negative effects on
rice farming income during the period of direct payment.
<Table 8: Rice Demand in Korea>
35

Source: MAFRA of Korea

36

Economic Statistics System (ECOS) of the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr)
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year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Rice consumed
per capita (kg)

83.2

82.0

80.7

78.8

76.9

75.8

74.0

72.8

71.2

69.8

Population
(1,000)

47,859

48,039

48,138

48,372

48,598

48,949

49,182

49,410

49,779

50,004

Total consumption
(million kg)

3,982

3,939

3,885

3,812

3,737

3,710

3,639

3,597

3,544

3,490

*Source: MAFRA of Korea
Table 8 shows the rice consumed per capita and total national rice consumption
calculated by multiplying per capita rice consumption and total national population. Rice
consumption per capita has dropped dramatically in Korea from 83.2kg in 2003 to 69.8kg in
2012. Although the population gradually increased each year, total consumption of rice declined
from 3,982 million kg in 2003 to 3,490 million kg in 2012.
<Table 9: Rice Farming Area per Household>
year
Farming area
per household(m2)

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

22,146 21,233 21,399 22,363

23,467

18,881

19,114

20,856

18,788

20,030

*Source: MAFRA of Korea
Furthermore, rice farming area per household has been slightly reduced as shown in
Table 9, which means rice farming households could not scale-up, but remained small farmers.
<Table 10: Number of Members per Rice Farming Household>
year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Number of
members

2.96

2.85

2.83

2.77

2.77

2.67

2.62

2.61

2.56

2.55

*Source: MAFRA of Korea
Table 10 shows that the number of individuals per rice farming household has also
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declined, which means that the number of family members who can earn money through farming
is lower and farming households do not have the same earning power as before. And, it also
means that rice farming households don’t need as much income as before.
These reasons may have contributed to the circumstances that made rice farming income
fails to increase during the direct payment program period. If the direct payment had not been
given to farmers, their income might have dropped even more.
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6. Policy Recommendations
Data and analysis show that the income level of rice farming households has not been
sufficiently supported under the current direct payment program. Considering the importance of
the rice industry in Korea, it seems that the Korean Government has to change its policy
directions. Recommendations have to be focused on fixing the program’s inherent problems
because environmental factors cannot easily be changed.
First, the target price has to be increased. From 2003 to 2012, the CPI (Consumer Price
Index) has gradually increased every year (Table 11). The CPI is determined by monthly data on
changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services37.
Target price should be adjusted to at least the increasing rate of CPI.
<Table 11: increasing rate of CPI>
year
Increase rate
of CPI (%)

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

3.5

3.6

2.8

2.2

2.5

4.7

2.8

3.0

4.0

2.2

*Source: E-Index of Statistics Korea (http://www.index.go.kr/potal)
Second, the payment should be given to the farmers rather than the land owners. The
purpose of this program is to support rice farming households and maintain the rice industry.
Supporting farmers themselves will enable them to keep farming rather than moving to other
industries.
Third, the calculation of direct payment has to consider income level rather than rice
paddy area. With this change, small farmers who need more support for their income can have
sufficient earnings to continue rice farming.

37

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
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